Andrew Leonard v. Stemtech International Inc by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-24-2016 
Andrew Leonard v. Stemtech International Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"Andrew Leonard v. Stemtech International Inc" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 821. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/821 
This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         
    PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
Nos. 15-3198 & 15-3247 
______________ 
 
ANDREW PAUL LEONARD, 
d/b/a APL Microscopic 
    Appellant in No. 15-3247 
v. 
 
STEMTECH INTERNATIONAL INC;  
STEMTECH HEALTHSCIENCES, INC.;  
JOHN DOES 1-100, Inclusive, 
 
          Stemtech International Inc and 
          Stemtech HealthSciences, Inc, 
                                         Appellants in No. 15-3198 
______________ 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE 
(D.C. Nos. 1-08-cv-00067, 1-12-cv-00086) 
District Judge: Honorable Leonard P. Stark 
______________ 
 
Argued July 12, 2016 
______________ 
Before: FUENTES, SHWARTZ, and RESTREPO, Circuit 
2 
 
Judges. 
 
(Filed:  August 24, 2016) 
 
Kathleen M. Kushi Carter, Esq [ARGUED] 
Christine R. Arnold, Esq. 
Hollins Law 
2601 Main Street 
Suite 1300 
Irvine, CA 92614 
 
Thomas P. Leff, Esq. 
Casarino Christman Shalk Ransom & Doss 
405 North King Street 
Suite 300, P.O. Box 1276 
Wilmington, DE 19899 
  Counsel for Appellants/Cross-Appellees 
 
Jan I. Berlage, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Gohn Hankey Stichel & Berlage 
201 North Charles Street 
Suite 2101 
Baltimore, MD 21201 
 
James S. Green, Sr., Esq. 
Jared Green, Esq. 
Seitz Van Ogtrop & Green 
222 Delaware Avenue 
Suite 1500, P.O. Box 68 
Wilmington, DE 19899 
  Counsel for Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
 
______________ 
 
3 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Andrew Leonard, a stem cell photographer, and 
Stemtech International, Inc., a company that sells nutritional 
supplements through independent distributors, cross appeal 
various rulings in the copyright infringement lawsuit Leonard 
brought against Stemtech in the District of Delaware.  For the 
reasons discussed herein, we will affirm the District Court’s 
pretrial, trial, and post-trial rulings, except the order denying 
prejudgment interest to Leonard, which we will vacate and 
remand. 
 
I 
 
A.  Andrew Leonard’s Images 
 
 Leonard takes photographs of stem cells using electron 
microscopes.  Only a few photographers engage in this highly 
technical type of photography.  Leonard obtains cell samples 
from doctors, scientists, and researchers and pays a scientific 
research institution to use an electron microscope to 
photograph the cells.  The images first appear in black and 
white, and Leonard uses his “artistic judgment” to enhance 
the photos in color.  J.A. 822-23. 
 
 Leonard created the images at issue in this case in the 
1990s.  Below are the two photographs at issue in this case.1  
                                              
 1 Leonard created these images in 1996 but did not 
register them with the U.S. Copyright Office until 2007, when 
he planned to bring this lawsuit. 
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The image on the left will be referred to as Image 3 and the 
right as Image 4. 
 
                              
                         
 
 Leonard markets his photographs through his business, 
APL Microscopic, and, during the relevant time period, used 
a stock photography agency known as Photo Researchers, 
Inc., to license his images.2  He only allows limited licenses 
of his images because, in his view, unlimited usage licenses 
decrease the value of his work.   
 
 The licensing fee Leonard charges varies depending on 
whether his images are used for commercial, editorial, or 
educational purposes.  Licensing fees are also impacted by 
the size, color, and the medium in which the images will 
appear.   
 
 During the 1990s and through the period at issue in 
this case, stem cell images were rare.  At that time, Leonard’s 
images were unique and sought after because there were very 
                                              
 2 Photo Researchers, Inc., is now known as Science 
Source. 
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few photographers who had the technical skill necessary to 
produce such work.  Even Stemtech’s Chief Scientific 
Officer, Christian Drapeau, testified that Leonard’s images 
were “extremely valuable.”  J.A. 1544.   
 
 In licensing his stem cell photographs, Leonard has 
received a range of fees, including a $4,000 fee for a non-
exclusive license to use his image at trade shows for one year, 
$6,500 for a one-time, non-exclusive license to use one of his 
images on a university website for four years, and $1,325 for 
a one-time, non-exclusive license to use his image in a 
brochure with a print run of 5,000.  He also received $1,500 
from Time magazine, which featured one of his images of a 
human bone marrow stem cell on its August 7, 2006 cover.3  
Between 2007 and 2012, Photo Researchers licensed 
Leonard’s images for fees ranging from less than $100 to 
several thousand dollars.   
 
B.  Stemtech and its Distributors 
 
 Stemtech “formulates” and sells nutritional supplement 
products through thousands of distributors, J.A. 1387, who 
form the backbone of the company.  Each distributor signs an 
agreement and is subject to Stemtech’s policies and 
procedures manual.  According to the manual, distributors are 
required to use only Stemtech marketing materials and its 
self-replicated websites.  Specifically, the manual provides:  
 
                                              
 3 Image 4 appeared on the cover of Time, albeit in a 
different pink and green color scheme.  Because a feature on 
the cover of Time meant worldwide exposure of his work, 
Leonard charged a reduced fee for this editorial use. 
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To promote both the products and the 
tremendous opportunity STEMTech offers, 
distributors must use the Marketing Materials 
and support materials produced by STEMTech. 
. . . Because the Internet recognizes no 
geographic borders (Domestic or Foreign), 
information on the Internet may be legal in one 
State or Country and illegal in another.  
Therefore, Distributors desiring to utilize an 
Internet web page to promote his/her 
distributorship must do so through the 
Company’s official website, using official 
STEMTech replicated templates. 
 
J.A. 2173-74 (emphasis and capitalization in original).  
Stemtech owns the domain and sub-domains of at least some 
of its distributors’ websites, and Stemtech’s vendor operates 
the server that hosts the Stemtech-supplied sites.  Distributors 
who purchase a website from Stemtech may customize the 
site only to provide the distributor’s name, phone number, 
email address, and a biography. 
 
C.  Leonard and Stemtech’s Initial Discussions 
 
 In May 2006, Stemtech contacted Leonard about using 
Image 4 for the “company[’s] internal magazine,” J.A. 869-
70, and for use on its website.  After discussing usage and 
color terms, Leonard provided Stemtech with a quote of $950 
for a “one-year usage” of Image 4 in two places in Stemtech’s 
HealthSpan magazine and a separate quote of $300 for a 
“one-year usage” of the image on the HealthSpan website.  
J.A. 871; 2120.  Stemtech declined to license the image for 
website use because “the price was too high,” J.A. 872, but 
chose to use the image twice in its magazine.   
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 Leonard sent Stemtech an invoice for $950 for the two 
magazine placements, but was only paid $500.  After multiple 
unsuccessful attempts to collect the $450 balance, Leonard 
abandoned his collection effort.  Not only did Stemtech fail to 
pay Leonard in full, but it used his images without a license in 
its other promotional materials. 
 
 The images appeared on Stemtech websites, its 
distributors’ websites, marketing DVDs, and other 
promotional and recruitment materials.  Several Stemtech 
officials and employees explained that using these images 
was important to Stemtech’s business.  Chief Scientific 
Officer Drapeau explained: “If you talk about stem cells, you 
need [ ] support for the discussion, so you . . . show a cell 
showing what it’s about . . . . It’s a marketing thing.  I 
understand [Leonard’s images’] value totally.  I mean, it’s a 
good representation.”  J.A. 1539, 1544.  George Antarr, 
Stemtech’s Director of North American Sales, produced the 
DVD in which one of Leonard’s images appeared, and 
explained the importance of a visual depiction of a stem cell 
in the video: “[W]e talked about stem cells in the product 
movie, so [ ] it would be good to show that, what one looks 
like . . . [b]ecause [a] visual [is] part of every sentence.  A 
picture tells a thousand words.”  J.A. 1510.  Thus, as Antarr 
noted, using a photograph was important to Stemtech’s 
marketing efforts.   
 
D.  Stemtech’s Unauthorized Use 
 
 To make sure his images were not used for 
unauthorized purposes, Leonard “periodically” conducted 
internet searches for images of stem cells.  J.A. 879-80.  In 
October 2007, Leonard discovered his images on numerous 
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Stemtech and Stemtech-affiliated websites.  He took 
screenshots of and archived the webpages on which his 
images appeared and retained copies of emails he sent to the 
contacts on various sites.  
 
 For example, Leonard found his images on 
“yourstems.com,” a website selling a Stemtech product called 
Stem Enhance and in a Stemtech e-book featured on the 
website.  J.A. 881, 889.  He contacted the site operator, 
informed him of the infringing uses, requested an accounting 
of how long the operator used the images, and sought 
payment for their use.  The website operator informed 
Leonard that he and other distributors were using materials 
received from Stemtech.  Thereafter, Leonard contacted 
Stemtech’s Chief Compliance Officer, Donna Serritella, 
requesting that Stemtech stop using his images.  Serritella 
told Leonard that she thought that one of the images “was on 
the cover of a major publication, and that made it public for 
usage.”  J.A. 898.   
 
 Despite being on notice of Leonard’s claim that 
Stemtech and its distributors were using his images without 
permission, Stemtech did not notify its distributors of his 
assertion, which it could have done via company-wide email, 
its weekly newsletter, or monthly communications.  In fact, 
Leonard continued to discover and document unauthorized 
uses of his photographs on Stemtech-affiliated websites and 
in its materials.  For example, in May 2008, Leonard’s friend 
ordered a Stemtech sales kit from a distributor.  The sales kit, 
intended for marketing the Stemtech product and training 
distributors, included DVDs with covers featuring one of 
Leonard’s images, and videos of “The Stemtech Story” and 
“Stem Cells and Stem Enhance with Christian Drapeau,” 
which also contained one of the images.  J.A. 905-10, 161.  
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Leonard continued to take screenshots of the websites and 
infringing materials, connecting them to Stemtech via website 
addresses, Stemtech-branded materials such as videos and 
PowerPoint presentations, distributor ID numbers, and even 
references and links encouraging website visitors to join the 
Stemtech distribution team.  Additionally, Leonard 
discovered his images on Stemtech’s website system, 
stemtechbiz.com, which involved “websites that Stemtech 
owned and operated,” as well as websites of individual 
distributors.  J.A. 945-46. 
 
E. The Civil Suit 
 
 Leonard demanded that Stemtech and several of its 
distributors pay him for the unauthorized use of his images.  
When Stemtech refused, Leonard filed the instant action, 
alleging numerous claims of copyright infringement.  
Following discovery and motion practice, a jury trial 
commenced on Leonard’s claims against Stemtech for direct, 
vicarious, and contributory infringement.4  The jury heard 
testimony from Leonard, a Photo Researchers employee, and 
Stemtech officials and distributors. 
 
 In addition, the jury heard testimony from Leonard’s 
damages expert, Jeffrey Sedlik.  Sedlik estimated the fair 
market value of a license to use the images.  To this end, he 
contacted two of the largest stock photo agencies and two 
agencies that specialize in scientific images to ascertain the 
                                              
 4 Stemtech does not appeal the jury’s verdict finding it 
liable for direct copyright infringement and Leonard does not 
appeal the order granting summary judgment to Stemtech on 
his claims for statutory damages and alleged infringement of 
other images.   
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fair market value of microscopic photography images when 
licensed for various forms of media comparable to those 
Stemtech used in its marketing materials.  From the quotes 
provided by these agencies, he generated a benchmark 
licensing fee of between $1,277.10 and $2,569.46.  He then 
applied the average of these fees to the 92 infringing uses 
identified at trial, which yielded a fee of $215,767.66.   
 
 Sedlik then adjusted this figure upward to account for 
the “scarcity or rarity” of Leonard’s images.  J.A. 1315-17.  
In other words, Sedlik attempted to capture “the market value 
of stem cell photographs in general, and then the scarcity or 
rarity of particular stem cell images, [which] is a factor that is 
considered in licensing.”5  J.A. 1313.  Sedlik recommended a 
premium of three to five times the benchmark to reflect the 
scarcity of the images.6  In addition, he adjusted the 
benchmark figure for “exclusivity,” which accounts for 
“overuse or broad use” of an image, which diminishes the 
value of other uses, by adding a premium of 3.75 to 8.75 
times the benchmark.  J.A. 1317-19.  After adding the 
adjustments together, he opined that the appropriate damages 
                                              
 5 On the rarity point, Sedlik noted that “[s]tem cell 
[photographs] [are] not Sasquatch; however, every 
photographer, everybody in the industry that saw that 2006 
cover of Time, that was kind of a turning point where people 
realized that microscopy can be an art form,” J.A. 1313, and 
“in 2006 and before, there were fewer images available.”  
J.A. 1314.   
 6 Sedlik testified that the multipliers were not applied 
as punishment for Stemtech’s unauthorized use of the images.  
J.A. 1307 (noting “in actual damages, the damages that 
[Sedlik] come[s] up with can’t be of a kind that punish the 
defendant”). 
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would range from $1.4 million to nearly $3 million.  
Stemtech neither cross-examined Sedlik about his use of 
these premiums nor presented its own expert, and asserted 
that Leonard’s past licensing history supported an award of 
only $1,804.   
 
   The jury returned a $1.6 million verdict in Leonard’s 
favor on his direct, vicarious, and contributory infringement 
claims against Stemtech.  The District Court denied 
Stemtech’s motion for a new trial on contributory and 
vicarious liability and damages. 
 
 In these cross appeals, we are asked to review whether 
the District Court abused its discretion in denying Stemtech’s 
motion for a new trial by finding that the jury’s contributory 
and vicarious infringement findings were supported by 
substantial evidence, and affirming the jury’s damages award, 
which Stemtech contends is unconstitutionally and grossly 
excessive.  We are also asked to review the District Court’s 
ruling that Leonard’s counsel’s conduct and certain 
evidentiary rulings did not warrant a new trial.  In addition, 
we are asked to consider whether the District Court abused its 
discretion in declining to award Leonard prejudgment 
interest, erred in not permitting the jury to consider awarding 
Leonard infringer’s profits under 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), and 
correctly decided two fee awards.   
 
II7 
 
A.  New Trial Standard 
                                              
 7 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, and 1338(a), and 17 U.S.C. § 101, et 
seq.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 We will first address Stemtech’s appeal of the order 
denying it a new trial.  While a court may grant a new trial 
under Rule 59 “for any reason for which a new trial has 
heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court,” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A), it should do so only when “the 
great weight of the evidence cuts against the verdict and . . . 
[ ] a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict were to 
stand,” Springer v. Henry, 435 F.3d 268, 274 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Williamson v. Consol. 
Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1352-53 (3d Cir. 1991) (new trial 
should be granted only where the verdict “cries out to be 
overturned” or “shocks [the] conscience”).  A district court’s 
power to grant a new trial is limited “to ensure that [it] does 
not substitute its judgment of the facts and the credibility of 
the witnesses for that of the jury.”  Delli Santi v. CNA Ins. 
Cos., 88 F.3d 192, 201 (3d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Our power is similarly limited and we 
review the grant or denial of a motion for a new trial for 
abuse of discretion.  Olefins Trading, Inc. v. Han Yang Chem. 
Corp., 9 F.3d 282, 289 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
 To demonstrate that the District Court erred in 
declining to grant it a new trial because the verdict was 
against the weight of the evidence, Stemtech must establish 
that (1) the jury reached an unreasonable result, and (2) the 
District Court abused its broad discretion in not setting the 
verdict aside.  See ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 
254, 268 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that while we exercise 
plenary review of “questions of law underlying a jury 
verdict,” putting those questions aside, a “‘jury verdict will 
not be overturned unless the record is critically deficient of 
that quantum of evidence from which a jury could have 
13 
 
rationally reached its verdict.’” (quoting Swineford v. Snyder 
Cty., 15 F.3d 1258, 1265 (3d Cir. 1994))). 
 
B.  Secondary Liability 
 
 Stemtech argues that a new trial is warranted because 
the jury’s contributory and vicarious infringement findings 
are not supported by substantial evidence.  Contributory and 
vicarious infringement are theories of secondary liability for 
copyright infringement that “emerged from common law 
principles and are well established in the law.”8  Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 
930 (2005).  “Secondary liability for copyright infringement 
does not exist in the absence of direct infringement by a third 
party.”  A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 
1013 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001).  Thus, to prove a claim of 
contributory or vicarious infringement, a plaintiff must first 
show direct infringement by a third party.  To prove direct 
infringement, a plaintiff must show that (1) it owns a valid 
copyright; (2) another party copied elements of its work 
without authorization; and (3) that party engaged in volitional 
conduct.  Kay Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199, 
203 (3d Cir. 2005); CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 
                                              
 8 While “the lines between direct infringement, 
contributory infringement and vicarious liability are not 
clearly drawn,” Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 n.9 (2005), “in general, 
contributory liability is based on the defendant’s failure to 
stop its own actions which facilitate third-party infringement, 
while vicarious liability is based on the defendant’s failure to 
cause a third party to stop its directly infringing activities.”  
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1175 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
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F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 2004).  Volitional conduct occurs 
when a party engages in “the act constituting infringement.”  
CoStar Group, 373 F.3d at 551 (distinguishing between 
internet entities that serve as conduits for transmission of 
copyrighted material and those who have an “interest in the 
copy itself”). 
 
 Leonard proved direct infringement by Stemtech 
distributors.  He demonstrated that he owned the copyrights 
to the infringed images, and that he did not authorize or 
license the use of his images in Stemtech’s advertising, 
marketing, and training materials.  The materials containing 
his images ranged from webpages and PDFs to videos and a 
PowerPoint presentation promoting Stemtech products.9  This 
evidence provided a sufficient basis for a jury to reasonably 
conclude that the distributors directly infringed Leonard’s 
copyrights.   
 Having determined that there was sufficient evidence 
to establish the predicate for secondary liability, we now turn 
to the claims against Stemtech for contributory and vicarious 
infringement.  
 
1.  Contributory Infringement 
 
 “One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing 
or encouraging direct infringement.”  Grokster, 545 U.S. at 
930.  To establish a claim of contributory infringement, a 
plaintiff must show: (1) a third party directly infringed the 
                                              
 9 Stemtech’s argument that Leonard failed to prove 
that Photo Researchers, his licensing agent at the time, did not 
license the images to Stemtech and/or its distributors, is, as 
the District Court noted, an improper attempt to shift the 
burden of an unproven defense of authorization. 
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plaintiff’s copyright; (2) the defendant knew that the third 
party was directly infringing; and (3) the defendant materially 
contributed to or induced the infringement.  See Gershwin 
Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 
1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (“[O]ne who, with knowledge of the 
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes 
to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 
‘contributory’ infringer.”); see also Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 
1171 (explaining that, “under Grokster, an actor may be 
contributorily liable for intentionally encouraging direct 
infringement if the actor knowingly takes steps that are 
substantially certain to result in such direct infringement”). 
 
 The District Court appropriately denied Stemtech’s 
motion for a new trial on Leonard’s contributory infringement 
claim.  As discussed above, there was sufficient evidence 
from which a jury could conclude that third parties, namely 
Stemtech’s distributors, directly infringed Leonard’s 
copyrights.  Furthermore, the evidence shows that Stemtech 
knew of the distributors’ infringing activity.  Stemtech itself 
created the materials containing Leonard’s images, provided 
the materials to its distributors, and required the distributors 
to use the materials.  Thus, Stemtech knew of its distributors’ 
infringing activities and plainly took “steps that [we]re 
substantially certain to result in such direct infringement.”  
Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1171-72.     
 
 We also note that the jury had a basis to conclude that 
Stemtech knew that the images it provided to its distributors 
were copyrighted.  The jury heard evidence that Stemtech had 
negotiated with Leonard for a limited-use license of one of 
his images in the HealthSpan magazine.  From this evidence, 
the jury could infer that, despite knowing that Leonard’s 
images were copyrighted, Stemtech required its distributors to 
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use the images Leonard owned to promote Stemtech’s 
products and thereby materially contributed to or induced 
their infringement.10 
 
 For these reasons, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that the jury’s contributory 
infringement verdict in favor of Leonard was not against the 
weight of the evidence and hence properly denied Stemtech’s 
motion for a new trial on Leonard’s contributory infringement 
claim. 
 
2.  Vicarious Infringement 
 
 The District Court also correctly denied the motion for 
a new trial on Leonard’s vicarious infringement claim.  
Vicarious infringement occurs when one “profit[s] from 
direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop 
or limit it.”  Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930.  To establish vicarious 
infringement, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant had (1) 
the right and ability to supervise or control the infringing 
activity; and (2) a direct financial interest in such activities.  
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930 & n.9; Am. Tel. and Tel. Co. v. 
Winback and Conserve Program, 42 F.3d 1421, 1441 (3d Cir. 
1994) (reciting similar standard).   
 
 The requirement that a defendant have the right to 
supervise or control is not limited to traditional agency 
                                              
 10 Stemtech’s sole defense to its use was its 
compliance officer’s belief that the image was in the public 
domain because it appeared on the cover of Time.  Even if her 
ignorance of the law were excusable, the fact that Stemtech 
entered into negotiations for a limited use of the images belies 
such ignorance.   
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relationships such as master-servant or employer-employee.  
Indeed, vicarious infringement liability has been imposed on 
a person or entity “even in the absence of an employer-
employee relationship . . . if [the person or entity] has the 
right and ability to supervise the infringing activity.”  
Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. 
L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963); see Napster, 
239 F.3d at 1022 (affirming extension, in copyright context, 
of vicarious liability beyond employer-employee 
relationship); see also Winback and Conserve Program, 42 
F.3d at 1441 (citing Gershwin and Shapiro, Bernstein).  Nor 
does the control element require the existence of a formal 
contract between the defendant and the infringer.  Rather, this 
element is satisfied where a “defendant’s ‘pervasive 
participation in the formation and direction’ of the direct 
infringer[’s]” activity supports a finding that “defendants 
were in a position to police the direct infringers.”  Fonovisa, 
Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262-63 (9th Cir. 
1996) (defendant flea market operator had right to exclude 
vendors and “controlled and patrolled” the premises) (quoting 
Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1163)); see Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 
1163 (imposing vicarious liability even where defendant 
lacked contractual ability to control direct infringer); Shapiro, 
Bernstein, 316 F.2d at 306 (imposing vicarious liability where 
parties had licensing agreement).  
 
 Cases from other circuits provide examples of conduct 
sufficient to demonstrate control.  In Shapiro, Bernstein, for 
example, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held a 
chain store company liable for the sale of infringing bootleg 
records by its licensee, who operated “the phonograph record 
department in . . . its stores,” because the company “retained 
the ultimate right of supervision over the conduct of the 
record concession and its employees.”  316 F.2d at 306, 308.  
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The court compared the situation to the numerous cases 
holding a “dance hall proprietor liable for the infringement of 
copyright resulting from the performance of a musical 
composition by a band or orchestra whose activities provide 
the proprietor with a source of customers and enhanced 
income[,] . . . whether the bandleader is considered, as a 
technical matter, an employee or an independent contractor.”  
Id. at 307 (collecting cases).  In Napster, the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit observed that the defendant, a file 
sharing program operator, “ha[d] the ability to locate 
infringing material listed on its search indices, and the right to 
terminate users’ access to the system.”  239 F.3d at 1024.   At 
the other end of the “spectrum” is the example of a landlord-
tenant case in which a “landlord leas[es] his property at a 
fixed rental to a tenant who engages in copyright-infringing 
conduct on the leased premises” and who generally does not 
have an obligation to police infringing conduct.  Shapiro, 
Bernstein, 316 F.2d at 307-08.   
 
 Like the chain store, dance-hall proprietor, and file-
sharing program operator, Stemtech had the right and ability 
to control the infringing activities of its distributors.  
Stemtech created and provided marketing materials to its 
distributors, and required their use.  It also had the contractual 
right to impose a range of disciplinary sanctions on 
distributors who violated its policies or engaged in illegal 
behavior, ranging from withholding compensation to 
terminating a distributorship agreement.  Additionally, 
Stemtech required its distributors to use “official STEMTech 
replicated templates” and websites that it controlled.  J.A. 
2139.  To the extent infringements occurred on what 
Stemtech asserts were unauthorized, independent websites, 
Stemtech still had the ability to induce compliance by 
distributors operating these websites by withholding 
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compensation and access to back office support.11  Stemtech 
thus had the “practical ability to police the third-party 
[distributors’] infringing conduct.”  Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 
1174.  The evidence of this contractual and financial 
relationship between Stemtech and its distributors provided a 
basis for the jury to conclude that Leonard satisfied the right 
and ability to supervise or control element.   
 
 Besides demonstrating control, a plaintiff must also 
show financial benefit to the defendant to prevail on a 
vicarious infringement claim.  Shapiro, Bernstein, 316 F.2d at 
307 (courts should consider the interplay between the two 
elements).  “Financial benefit exists where the availability of 
infringing material acts as a draw for customers.”  Ellison v. 
Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1078, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  “There is no requirement 
that the draw be substantial.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
  
 The jury could reasonably have credited the testimony 
from Stemtech officials indicating that images of stem cells 
lend legitimacy to products that purportedly enhance stem 
cell production and from this infer that the images could have 
drawn customers to buy the product, which would financially 
benefit Stemtech.  Thus, there was sufficient evidence from 
which the jury could find that the financial benefit element 
was met.  Because the verdict was not against the weight of 
the evidence, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Stemtech’s motion for a new trial on Leonard’s 
vicarious infringement claim. 
                                              
 11 Stemtech’s ability to control its distributors is further 
reflected by the fact that when it asked a distributor to stop 
using the images, the distributor complied. 
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C.  Damages 
 
1.  The Jury Award 
 
 Stemtech argues that the jury’s $1.6 million actual 
damages award was unconstitutionally and grossly excessive, 
and therefore should be reduced or vacated and remanded for 
a new damages trial.  We will first discuss the methods for 
calculating actual damages under the Copyright Act, then 
review the District Court’s decision to permit Leonard’s 
damages expert to testify, and finally examine whether the 
award here was unconstitutionally or grossly excessive. 
 
a.  Actual Damages under § 504(b) 
 
 Section 504 of the Copyright Act authorizes recovery 
of “the actual damages suffered by [the copyright owner] as a 
result of the infringement.”  17 U.S.C. § 504(b).  Although 
the Act does not define “actual damages,” our sister circuits 
have explained that an actual damages award “looks at the 
facts from the point of view of the[] copyright owners; it 
undertakes to compensate the owner for any harm he suffered 
by reason of the infringer’s illegal act.”  On Davis v. The 
Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 2001).  These damages 
“are usually determined by the loss in the fair market value of 
the copyright, measured by the profits lost due to the 
infringement or by the value of the use of the copyrighted 
work to the infringer.”  McRoberts Software, Inc. v. Media 
100, Inc., 329 F.3d 557, 566 (7th Cir. 2003); see Fitzgerald 
Publ’g Co. v. Baylor Publ’g Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1118 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (“[T]he primary measure of recovery is the extent 
to which the market value of the copyrighted work at the time 
of the infringement has been injured or destroyed by the 
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infringement.”) (citing 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 14.02 at 14-
6); Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 312 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Fitzgerald, supra).  Because the Act “should be 
broadly construed to favor victims of infringement,” On 
Davis, 246 F.3d at 164, “uncertainty will not preclude a 
recovery of actual damages if the uncertainty is as to amount, 
but not as to the fact that actual damages are attributable to 
the infringement,” 4 Nimmer on Copyright § 14.02[A], at 12-
14; see, e.g., On Davis, 246 F.3d at 166 (explaining that the 
jury’s calculation of actual damages may not be based on 
“undue speculation” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Sygma Photo News, Inc. v. High Soc. Magazine, Inc., 778 
F.2d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1985) (“Confronted with imprecision in 
the computation of expenses, the court should err on the side 
of guaranteeing the plaintiff a full recovery.”).  Some 
uncertainty stems from the fact that the Copyright Act does 
not specify how damages should be calculated.  See 
Mayweather, 731 F.3d at 312.  Case law, however, describes 
the permissible methods for determining damages. 
 
 One method involves calculating the fair market value 
of the licensing fees “the owner was entitled to charge for 
such use.”  On Davis, 246 F.3d at 165 (explaining that “[i]f a 
copier of protected work, instead of obtaining permission and 
paying the fee, proceeds without permission and without 
compensating the owner . . . the owner has suffered damages 
to the extent of the infringer’s taking without paying what the 
owner was legally entitled to exact a fee for”).  Fair market 
value is often described as “the reasonable licensing fee on 
which a willing buyer and a willing seller would have agreed 
for the use taken by the infringer.”  Id. at 167; see Jarvis v. 
K2 Inc., 486 F.3d 526, 534 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying 
standard); Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F.3d 909, 917 (9th Cir. 
2002) (noting that the “market value approach is an objective, 
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not a subjective, analysis”).  Another method for calculating 
damages focuses on the plaintiff’s own past licensing fees.  
See, e.g., Jarvis, 486 F.3d at 534 (noting district court 
calculated damages using plaintiff’s past license).  Stemtech 
asks us to use the past licensing fee method but cites no 
authority requiring the use of this method as opposed to the 
fair market value approach, and case law on this subject 
supports using the fair market value.  See On Davis, 246 F.3d 
at 166 (“The question is not what the owner would have 
charged, but rather what is the fair market value.”); 
Mayweather, 731 F.3d at 312 (describing both calculation 
methods and noting “general[ ] accept[ance]” of fair market 
value approach).  Because the jury was instructed about both 
methods for determining actual damages, and had an 
evidentiary basis for applying the fair market value through 
Sedlik’s expert testimony, there was no error in allowing the 
jury to consider evidence about damages based on the fair 
market value approach. 
 
b.  Admission of Sedlik’s Expert Opinion 
 
 Stemtech challenges the denial of its Daubert motion 
to exclude Sedlik’s testimony on various grounds, including, 
as relevant here, the basis for his opinions.  In denying the 
motion, the District Court determined that Sedlik’s method 
for calculating Leonard’s actual damages using fair market 
value, as opposed to Leonard’s past licensing history, was 
reliable, as there is no requirement that actual damages be 
calculated based on a plaintiff’s own history of licensing fees.  
It also concluded that Sedlik had a factual basis for his 
calculation based upon the quotes he received for other 
photographs.  Finally, the District Court concluded that there 
was a fit between the facts of the case and Sedlik’s damages 
calculation, and that challenges to the fit and reliability of the 
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fair market value method could be pursued via cross-
examination.12 
 
 Stemtech argues that the District Court erred in 
denying its Daubert motion, claiming that Leonard failed to 
lay a foundation for Sedlik’s lump sum damages figure 
because Sedlik’s testimony revealed “he relied on unverified 
information from Leonard’s counsel and did not make an 
independent determination of usages or infringements or 
calculate separate fees for the 92 alleged infringements.”  
Appellant’s Br. 57 (citing J.A. 1304-05, 1307-09, 1310-11, 
1316, 1320).  We review the admission or exclusion of expert 
testimony for abuse of discretion.  Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 
520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008).  “It is an abuse of 
discretion to admit expert testimony which is based on 
assumptions lacking any factual foundation in the record.”  
Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 414 
(3d Cir. 2002).    
 
 Sedlik adopted the recognized fair market value 
approach for calculating damages.  To enable him to estimate 
the fair market value, he collected quotes from Getty Images 
and other photo licensing agencies and obtained a range of 
licensing fees for various uses similar to those involved in the 
case, averaged them, and then applied the average to the 92 
alleged instances of infringement.  Stemtech’s disagreement 
with the calculation methodology and the underlying 
assumptions Sedlik made about which images and uses were 
similar to those in this case goes to the weight given to his 
testimony, rather than admissibility.  See Breidor v. Sears, 
                                              
 12 We note that Stemtech failed to file objections to the 
Magistrate Judge’s memorandum order denying Stemtech’s 
Daubert motion. 
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Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1134, 1138-39 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(“Where there is a logical basis for an expert’s opinion 
testimony, the credibility and weight of that testimony is to be 
determined by the jury, not the trial judge.”).  Thus, the 
District Court appropriately denied the Daubert motion, and 
the jury was properly permitted to consider Sedlik’s 
testimony about damages. 
 
c.  Excessiveness 
 
 Because we are deferential to a jury’s damages verdict, 
that verdict may be disturbed only if it is so grossly excessive 
that it shocks the judicial conscience, William A. Graham Co. 
v. Haughey, 646 F.3d 138, 142 (3d Cir. 2011) (Graham II), or 
if it is unconstitutionally excessive because it is predicated on 
an impermissible basis, Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 
F.3d 688, 715-18 (3d Cir. 2010).  With respect to a claim that 
a damage award is grossly excessive, our review is 
“exceedingly narrow” and our “responsibility [is] to review a 
damage award to determine if it is rationally based.”  Id. at 
718.  This standard “exists to ensure that a district court does 
not substitute its judgment of the facts and the credibility of 
the witnesses for that of the jury,” and is “even more pressing 
at the appellate level, where the judges have not had the 
opportunity to observe the trial.”  Graham II, 646 F.3d at 143 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, although we view 
the facts “in the light most favorable to” the defendant, 
Cortez, 617 F.3d at 719, “[a] jury’s damages award will not 
be upset so long as there exists sufficient evidence on the 
record, which if accepted by the jury, would sustain the 
award,” Thabault v. Chait, 541 F.3d 512, 532 (3d Cir. 2008).  
If a court determines that “the amount of the award is 
inconsistent with the evidence in a case,” it “must offer a new 
trial as a[] [conditional] alternative to a reduction in the award 
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in order to avoid depriving the plaintiff of his/her Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial.”  Cortez, 617 F.3d at 716. 
 
 Of course, the award must also be consistent with the 
governing law.  The Copyright Act sets forth the available 
damages for a prevailing plaintiff.  Stemtech correctly notes 
that the Act does not authorize recovery of punitive damages.  
See 17 U.S.C. § 504.  Stemtech, however, wrongly asserts 
that the $1.6 million award includes punitive damages.  To 
understand why, we will examine Sedlik’s expert damages 
opinion. 
 
 As recounted above, Leonard’s expert, Sedlik, 
surveyed four stock photo agencies to obtain image licensing 
rates for uses similar to the infringing uses, and averaged the 
quotes to arrive at a per-use licensing fee of between 
$1,277.10 and $2,569.46.  These fees factored in the image 
size, form of media, size of audience, geographical scope, 
placement, number of appearances, and length of the license.  
Sedlik selected a figure within this range, multiplied it by the 
92 infringements presented at trial, and arrived at a 
“benchmark” fair market value calculation of $215,767.65.   
 
 In Sedlik’s opinion, this figure did not account for 
scarcity—the rarity of stem cell images—or exclusivity—that 
is, how Stemtech’s extensive use would be akin to an 
exclusive license that would eliminate or reduce licensing 
revenue from other sources and/or decrease the value of 
Leonard’s work.  Sedlik testified that a “premium” or 
multiplier of three to five times the benchmark figure was 
warranted to account for the scarcity, and a multiplier of 3.75 
to 8.75 times the benchmark was appropriate to account for 
the exclusivity of Leonard’s images during the infringement 
period, which yielded a total estimated range of actual 
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damages of approximately $1.4 million to nearly $3 million.  
In addition to explaining that the benchmark figure needed to 
be enhanced because it did not capture the rarity or 
exclusivity of Leonard’s images, Sedlik informed the jury that 
“the damages that [he] come[s] up with can’t be of a kind that 
punish[es] the defendant.”  J.A. 1307. 
 
 Despite this comment, Stemtech claims the multipliers 
Sedlik applied are actually an impermissible penalty “akin to 
punitive damages, which are not recoverable under § 504(b) 
of the Copyright Act.”13  Grant Heilman Photography, 115 F. 
Supp. 3d at 527.  In response, Leonard argues that these 
multipliers are not punitive but rather comprise elements of 
the fair market value of his images, and that the $215,767 
                                              
 13 In our view, there is a question as to whether 
Stemtech waived its challenge to Leonard’s use of a 
multiplier as part of his damages proof.  Sedlik disclosed his 
reliance on a multiplier for scarcity and mentioned exclusivity 
as an additional relevant factor in his report, but Stemtech 
never challenged either factor in its Daubert motion.  
Moreover, it did not cross-examine Sedlik at trial on this topic 
and raised the multiplier issue for the first time in its motion 
for a new trial.  Leonard, however, does not argue waiver, so 
he arguably “waived” his right to oppose Stemtech’s 
challenge to the jury award on this basis.  See Freeman v. 
Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 250 (3d Cir. 
2013) (“The doctrine of appellate waiver is not somehow 
exempt from itself.  This means that a party can waive a 
waiver argument by not making the argument below or in its 
briefs.” (internal citation omitted)).  Because the District 
Court had an opportunity to address the issue, and Leonard 
has not asserted waiver, we will address Stemtech’s challenge 
to Leonard’s use of a multiplier for scarcity and exclusivity. 
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benchmark was not the complete fair market value sum 
because Sedlik had not yet accounted for scarcity and 
exclusivity.   
 
 The few district courts to consider the use of punitive 
multipliers have concluded that such use is improper under 
the Copyright Act because “[t]he value of what was illegally 
taken is not determined by multiplying it.”  Stehrenberger v. 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d 466, 
469 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Grant Heilman Photography, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 526-27; 
Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 576 F. Supp. 2d 609, 
617 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting use of punitive multiplier for 
unauthorized use to calculate “actual damages” under § 
504(b)); Straus v. DVC Worldwide, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 2d 
620, 648-49 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (crediting testimony of 
defendant’s expert Jeff Sedlik, who stated that “multipliers 
are used only when the parties include them in licensing 
agreements and are enforced as part of the contract,” but “are 
not used to determine the fair market value of a license at the 
time infringement occurs,” and noting that use of a multiplier 
would be punitive in that case).14  These courts rejected the 
use of a multiplier or “‘fee for unauthorized usage’” over and 
above what “would otherwise represent a fair and reasonable 
licensing fee for the infringed material” as a component of the 
actual damages calculation.  Stehrenberger, 335 F. Supp. 2d 
at 467.   We agree with the reasoning of these district courts 
that, under the Copyright Act, an actual damages award may 
not include such a punitive component.  We also agree with 
                                              
 14 Cf. Bruce v. Weekly World News, Inc., 310 F.3d 25, 
27 n.1 (1st Cir. 2002) (permitting multiplier for unauthorized 
use in a § 504(b) case where the parties agreed on the use of a 
multiplier).   
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Leonard that this case does not involve the use of a multiplier 
to penalize unauthorized use.  Rather, the record demonstrates 
that the multiplier here was used to calculate fair market 
value. 
 
 The jury had sufficient evidence to credit Sedlik’s 
opinion and conclude that the sum calculated from the stock 
photo agency rates did not represent a full calculation of the 
fair market value of Leonard’s images because the rates did 
not account for scarcity and exclusivity.  Put differently, 
Sedlik’s fair market value calculation in this case had two 
components: the stock agency quotes and the adjustments to 
reflect the uniqueness of the images and the impact of 
Stemtech’s usage.  The multipliers here reflected a premium 
that, according to Sedlik, the market would find acceptable 
given the scarcity and exclusivity of the images as compared 
to the images for which he had secured rates for comparative 
purposes.  The unrebutted evidence here showed that the fair 
market value calculation was complete only after these 
additional factors were applied.   
 
 Since Stemtech presented no evidence or methodology 
to cast doubt on the use of multipliers to account for factors 
relevant to a final fair market value, neither the District Court 
nor the jury had any basis to discount this aspect of Sedlik’s 
testimony.  Because there is no evidence that the scarcity and 
exclusivity multipliers were punitive rather than valid factors 
for calculating fair market value, we cannot say that the 
verdict is based upon an improper consideration.15 
                                              
 15 Stemtech also argues that the jury award was 
unconstitutionally excessive under the Due Process Clause.  
Ordinarily, Due Process challenges are appropriately directed 
at punitive damages awards, which are intended to punish 
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 Nor is the verdict grossly excessive.  As noted above, 
courts are loath to substitute their judgment for that of the 
jury.  While the award here was quite high, and perhaps 
surprising, we cannot say it lacked an evidentiary basis such 
that it “shock[s] the judicial conscience.”  Graham II, 646 
F.3d at 143.  The jury heard unrebutted expert testimony that 
provided it with the basis for the fair market value assigned to 
the images, which included both a benchmark for similar but 
less unique images and a range for a premium to reflect the 
rarity of Leonard’s image and its unusually widespread use in 
Stemtech’s materials.  Sedlik provided a multiplier of three to 
five times the benchmark for scarcity and 3.75 to 8.75 times 
for exclusivity, and opined that the fair market value for use 
of the images would be determined by multiplying these 
figures by the benchmark sum of $215,767.65.  The jury 
returned a verdict of $1.6 million, which represents a final 
sum at the lower end of Sedlik’s proposed range.   
 
 The damages award was tethered to the record, which 
the jury was entitled to credit, and the jury was presented with 
no evidence that provided an alternative calculation.  See 
Thabault, 541 F.3d at 532-33 (reviewing testimony of 
                                                                                                     
defendants, rather than at compensatory damages awards, 
which are simply intended to redress a plaintiff’s loss.  See 
Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Toll Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 
432 (2001) (discussing distinction between punitive and 
compensatory awards for Due Process purposes); United 
States ex rel. Drakeford v. Tuomey, 792 F.3d 364, 387 (4th 
Cir. 2015) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not apply to 
compensatory damage awards.”).  Here, our conclusion that 
the damages award did not include a punitive component is 
fatal to Stemtech’s constitutional excessiveness claim. 
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damages expert, noting defendant’s attempts to discredit 
expert at trial, and concluding that “it is clear that if the jury 
accepted his calculation there was sufficient evidence to 
sustain [the award] as detailed by his testimony”).  In light of 
our deferential standard of review, we conclude that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new 
trial on the basis of a grossly excessive jury verdict. 
 
2.  Infringer’s Profits 
 
 In addition to authorizing recovery of actual damages, 
the Copyright Act allows a plaintiff to recover “any profits of 
the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are 
not taken into account in computing the actual damages.”  17 
U.S.C. § 504(b).  These are “profits earned not by selling an 
infringing product, but rather earned from the infringer’s 
operations that were enhanced by the infringement.”16  
William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 568 F.3d 425, 442 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (Graham I).  Under the Act, to “establish[] the 
infringer’s profits, the copyright owner is required to present 
proof only of the infringer’s gross revenue, and the infringer 
is required to prove his or her deductible expenses and the 
elements of profit attributable to factors other than the 
copyrighted work.”  17 U.S.C. § 504(b).  Though the Act 
                                              
 16 Direct profits may also constitute infringer’s profits 
where, for example, a defendant sells an infringing product.  
To the extent Leonard claims that the District Court failed to 
consider his evidence of direct profits from Stemtech’s sale of 
DVDs containing his images, this claim is waived as he 
conceded in his opposition to Stemtech’s summary judgment 
motion that he was not seeking such direct profits.  Moreover, 
Leonard presented no evidence of any profits Stemtech made 
from DVD sales.   
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requires a copyright owner to present proof of the infringer’s 
“gross revenue” to support its initial burden, courts interpret 
the term to mean the gross revenue that is “reasonably related 
to the infringement.”  Graham I, 568 F.3d at 443 (quoting On 
Davis, 246 F.3d at 160); see Polar Bear Prods., Inc. v. Timex 
Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 711-12 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting it would 
“make little practical or legal sense” to conclude a plaintiff 
satisfies his burden simply by “offer[ing] an overall gross 
revenue number . . . and sit[ting] back”); Taylor v. Meirick, 
712 F.2d 1112, 1122 (7th Cir. 1983) (“If General Motors 
were to steal your copyright and put it in a sales brochure, 
you could not just put a copy of General Motors’ corporate 
income tax return in the record and rest your case for an 
award of infringer’s profits.”). 
 
 Under § 504(b), we use a “‘two-step framework for 
recovery of indirect profits.” Graham I, 568 F.3d at 442.  
First, the plaintiff must demonstrate a “causal nexus between 
the infringement and the [infringer’s] gross revenue,” or put 
differently, show that the infringement contributed to the 
infringer’s profits.  Id. (alteration in original).  Second, “once 
the ca[usal] nexus is shown, the infringer bears the burden of 
apportioning the profits that were not the result of 
infringement” and may adduce evidence of offsets permitted 
by the statute.  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)    
 
 The District Court granted Stemtech’s motion for 
summary judgment on Leonard’s request for infringer’s 
profits, concluding that the evidence he presented was too 
speculative for a jury to find that he was entitled to infringer’s 
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profits.17  To support his request for infringer’s profits, 
Leonard submitted proof of Stemtech’s total gross revenues.  
In addition, Leonard pointed to: (1) the regular use of his 
images in Stemtech marketing and training materials; (2) the 
requirement that Stemtech distributors use Stemtech’s 
replicated websites and marketing materials; and (3) his 
expert’s conclusion that “Stemtech’s many usages of 
Leonard’s photographs conclusively demonstrates that 
Stemtech exploited Leonard’s photograph[s] to promote its 
brand, to promote understanding of its company and products, 
to train and recruit distributors and to provide those 
distributors with tools which were used to maximize 
Stemtech’s profits.”  J.A. 336 (internal quotation marks and 
emphasis omitted).   
 
 None of this evidence shows how or why Leonard’s 
images, as opposed to other aspects of Stemtech’s marketing 
materials, influenced profits.  As the District Court correctly 
found, this evidence did not “link customer decisions to 
purchase [Stemtech]’s product with [Stemtech]’s use of his 
[i]mages on its website, or in its videos, HealthSpan 
publication or other marketing materials, as opposed to any 
other reason why a customer might purchase those products.”  
J.A. 337.  We agree with these observations and with the 
conclusion that, while “it is conceivable that the presence of 
the [i]mages in [Stemtech]’s materials added an air of 
                                              
 17 We review the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment de novo, Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d 173, 
175 (3d Cir. 2007), applying the same standard as the District 
Court and viewing facts and making reasonable inferences in 
the non-movant’s favor.  Hugh v. Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 
418 F.3d 265, 266-67 (3d Cir. 2005).   
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legitimacy to [Stemtech]’s product that might not have 
otherwise existed, and that the [i]mages could possibly have 
had some impact, whether consciously or subconsciously, on 
consumer purchasing decisions . . . [m]ere conceivability . . . 
is not enough.  Instead, Plaintiff must identify evidence 
showing that the infringing use was ‘reasonably related to the 
infringement,’” and the evidence cited above amounted to 
mere speculation regarding the causal connection.18  J.A. 334.  
                                              
 18 For examples discussing infringer’s profits, see 
Mackie, 296 F.3d at 916 (insufficient evidence of causal 
nexus between “the Symphony’s infringing use of [artwork 
called] ‘The Tango’ and any Pops series revenues generated 
through the inclusion of the collage in the direct-mail 
literature,” in part due to the “virtually endless permutations 
to account for an individual’s decision to subscribe to the 
Pops series, reasons that have nothing to do with the artwork 
in question”); cf. Graham I, 568 F.3d at 442 (sufficient 
evidence of causal nexus in a case where the copyrighted 
materials were sample insurance proposals, and where 
plaintiff’s expert “identified client proposals issued by USI 
that included infringing language and then calculated the 
revenues obtained by USI from those clients [who had 
received] infringing proposal[s]” and USI personnel testified 
“that the written proposals . . . were an important part of the 
sales process . . . that . . . convinced [some clients] to 
purchase insurance through USI”); Polar Bear Prods., 384 
F.3d at 700, 712 (sufficient evidence of causal nexus where 
expert calculated revenue from trade shows at which Timex 
used unauthorized “PaddleQuest” materials to promote its 
Expedition line of watches to outdoor sports enthusiasts, 
including a continuous-loop extreme-kayaking film produced 
by plaintiff, where expert “concluded that approximately 10% 
to 25% of trade show sales are the result of excitement 
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There was no evidence upon which a reasonable juror could 
have calculated infringer’s profits.  Because none of 
Leonard’s evidence “create[d] a triable issue regarding 
whether the infringement at least partially caused the profits 
that the infringer generated as the result of the infringement,” 
Mackie, 296 F.3d at 911, we will affirm the District Court’s 
order granting summary judgment in Stemtech’s favor on 
Leonard’s request for infringer’s profits. 
 
3.  Prejudgment Interest 
 
 Leonard argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion in denying his motion for prejudgment interest.  An 
award of actual damages under the Copyright Act alone “does 
not mitigate harm caused by delay in making reparations—a 
harm the remedy of prejudgment interest is uniquely tailored 
to address.  Simply put, prejudgment interest is a different 
remedy for a different harm.”  Polar Bear Prods., 384 F.3d at 
718 (cited with approval in Graham II, 646 F.3d at 144-45).  
Prejudgment interest “mak[es] the claimant whole and 
prevent[s] unjust enrichment.”  Graham II, 646 F.3d at 145.  
As we noted in Graham II, we “favor[ ] permitting 
prejudgment interest awards” to make a plaintiff whole in 
copyright cases, id. at 144 (emphasis omitted), because “as 
between a copyright owner and an infringer, the former has 
the stronger equitable claim to the time-value of income 
                                                                                                     
created by the booth promotion, of which the . . . materials 
were a substantial part”); Andreas v. Volkswagen of Am., 
Inc., 336 F.3d 789, 791-97 (8th Cir. 2003) (sufficient nexus 
between Audi’s use of a copyrighted poem in a commercial 
and profits from the ad campaign, where evidence showed 
that the “infringement was the centerpiece of [the] 
commercial”).   
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derived from his creation,” id. at 145; see Booker v. Taylor 
Milk Co., 64 F.3d 860, 868 (3d Cir. 1995) (describing general 
presumption in favor of prejudgment interest awards).  For 
this reason, our Court subscribes to “our usual rule,” Graham 
II, 646 F.3d at 145, that “a monetary award does not fully 
compensate for injury unless it includes an interest 
component,” Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 10 (2001).   
 
 Accordingly, “prejudgment interest is available in 
copyright cases at the District Court’s discretion, exercised in 
light of ‘considerations of fairness.’”  Graham II, 646 F.3d at 
145-46 (affirming District Court’s grant of nearly $5 million 
in prejudgment interest) (quoting Pignataro v. Port Auth. of 
N.Y. and N.J., 593 F.3d 265, 274 (3d Cir. 2010)).  In Booker, 
our Court ruled that it is an abuse of discretion for a district 
court to deny an award for prejudgment interest based on the 
conclusion that the actual damages award “alone wholly 
compensated Plaintiff, and that, because Plaintiff’s conduct 
contributed to an inflated [damages] claim, the equities 
weighed against prejudgment interest.”  64 F.3d at 868-69 
(emphasis in original) (awarding prejudgment interest on a 
back pay award).  A district court “may exercise its discretion 
to depart from th[e] presumption [of awarding interest] only 
when it provides a justification that reasonably supports the 
departure.”  Id. at 868.  In other words, “[i]f prejudgment 
interest is denied, the District Court must explain why the 
usual equities in favor of such interest are not applicable.”  
Pignataro, 593 F.3d at 274.   
 
 The District Court here denied prejudgment interest, 
explaining that it viewed such an award in this case as 
“inequitable and unfair” because the verdict “sufficiently 
compensated” Leonard “for the misappropriated value of his 
property” and “the award of interest would constitute a 
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windfall to Leonard.”  J.A. 1737-38 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  In this regard, the District Court observed that the 
verdict represented a per-use licensing fee far greater than the 
per-use fees Leonard previously received for use of the 
infringed images.  It also noted that awarding “sums on top of 
the $1.6 million already awarded is not necessary to ensure 
that . . . [Stemtech] is adequately deterred,” J.A. 1739, and 
emphasized that there was no jury finding of willful conduct 
on Stemtech’s part.  As an additional ground for denying 
prejudgment interest, the District Court cited the difficulty of 
calculating the “appropriate amount” of interest due to 
numerous infringements.  J.A. 1739. 
 
 As in Booker, the District Court here was concerned 
with the high jury award and denied Leonard’s motion for 
prejudgment interest because it deemed the $1.6 million 
actual damages award sufficient to compensate him.  
However, prejudgment interest serves a different purpose and 
Leonard was “entitled” to recompense “for the loss of the use 
of the amount” of actual damages.  Booker, 64 F.3d at 869; 
see Graham II, 646 F.3d at 145 (emphasizing that 
“recoup[ment] [of] the time-value of [a plaintiff’s] loss . . . is 
not . . . confined to the provision of just compensation,” but 
also prevents a “losing defendant” from “retain[ing] . . . a 
windfall in the form of an interest-free loan”).  Therefore, 
denying prejudgment interest on the ground that the damages 
award sufficiently compensated Leonard constitutes legal 
error.   
 
 Moreover, while we are not unmindful of the 
challenges related to calculating prejudgment interest in this 
case, with the 92 separate infringements that occurred on 
different dates, difficulty in calculating prejudgment interest 
is generally not a basis to deny an interest award.  See, e.g., 
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Hutchison v. Amateur Elec. Supply, Inc., 42 F.3d 1037, 1047 
(7th Cir. 1994) (holding that “uncertainty” in calculating 
prejudgment interest does not “defeat the presumption in 
favor of prejudgment interest” and “[i]t is not within the 
district court’s discretion to deny the whole award of interest 
because of . . . calculational ambiguities”); Williamson v. 
Handy Button Mach. Co., 817 F.2d 1290, 1299 (7th Cir. 
1987) (“No purpose would be served by allowing the 
wrongdoer to keep the entire time value of the money, just 
because the exact amount is subject to fair dispute.  Once we 
know that [damages are] at least some minimum, it is safe to 
award interest on that amount.”).  We note that a prevailing 
party moving for an award of prejudgment interest must 
provide the district court with sufficient information to 
calculate the interest or inform the court of the evidence it 
needs (such as information within the other party’s control) to 
make its application.  Where a prevailing party fails to 
provide the district court with this information, such an award 
may be denied.19   
                                              
 19 An award may also be denied if the prevailing party 
engages in dilatory tactics during litigation or unnecessarily 
protracts the proceedings.  Cf. City of Milwaukee v. Cement 
Div., Nat’l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 196 (1995) (citing 
“undue delay” as “the most obvious example” justifying the 
denial of prejudgment interest (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 
656-57 (explaining that in the patent infringement context, “it 
may be appropriate to limit prejudgment interest, or perhaps 
even deny it altogether, where the patent owner has been 
responsible for undue delay in prosecuting the lawsuit”).  
Consistent with Devex, we note that “[t]here may be other 
circumstances in which it may be appropriate not to award 
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 Here, the District Court stated that Leonard did not 
adequately address Stemtech’s assertion that the interest 
should be calculated based on “perhaps 92 different accrual 
dates and interest rates.”  J.A. 1739.  However, Leonard in 
fact offered to provide information on this topic if the Court 
deemed his proposed approach to use a single infringement 
date inadequate.  Thus, Leonard was apparently ready to 
provide the information, including the dates on which he 
discovered each infringement.  The District Court seems to 
have overlooked this offer, and therefore its views about the 
difficulty in calculation may have been misplaced. 
 
 Because the District Court denied prejudgment interest 
based upon its view that Leonard was sufficiently 
compensated, its order “rest[ed] upon  . . . errant 
conclusion[s] of law.”  Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 
237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008).  Moreover, because it found that 
calculating the interest was too difficult without fully 
considering the material Leonard was prepared to provide, its 
order rested on an erroneous finding of fact.  We therefore 
will vacate the order denying an award of prejudgment 
interest and remand for the District Court to award 
prejudgment interest in the amount it deems appropriate 
under the governing law.20   
                                                                                                     
prejudgment interest,” but “[w]e need not delineate those 
circumstances in this case.”  461 U.S. at 657. 
 20 The District Court has discretion in selecting the 
appropriate interest rate and date(s) of infringement from 
which the interest begins to accrue.  See Graham II, 646 F.3d 
at 146-51 (holding that prejudgment interest “may be 
awarded in appropriate cases from the initial accrual date” but 
leaving open the possibility that other cases may warrant 
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D.  Trial Issues 
 
 Stemtech also asserts that it is entitled to a new trial 
based upon alleged improper conduct by Leonard’s counsel 
and the erroneous admission of certain evidence.  We will 
address these contentions in turn. 
 
1.  Counsel’s Conduct 
 
 Stemtech complains that Leonard’s counsel made 
comments during the trial that so prejudiced the jury that the 
District Court should have granted a new trial.  Counsel’s 
conduct “constitutes reversible error” only where he or she 
engaged in “argument injecting prejudicial extraneous 
evidence,” Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 
F.2d 171, 210 (3d Cir. 1992), such that the “improper 
statements . . . so pervade[d] the trial as to render the verdict a 
product of prejudice,” Draper v. Airco, Inc., 580 F.2d 91, 96 
(3d Cir. 1978).  “Because the trial judge was present and able 
to judge the impact of counsel’s remarks, we defer to his 
assessment of the prejudicial impact.”  Fineman, 980 F.2d at 
207; Draper, 580 F.2d at 94 (recognizing that the trial judge 
has “considerable discretion in determining whether conduct 
by counsel is so prejudicial as to require a new trial”).  We 
thus review the decision to grant or deny a motion for a new 
trial based upon counsel’s conduct for abuse of discretion.  
Fineman, 980 F.2d at 206.   
                                                                                                     
alternate approaches); see also Kansas, 533 U.S. at 11 
(concluding special master did not err in determining that 
“considerations of fairness . . . supported the award of at least 
some prejudgment interest” (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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 Stemtech first argues that Leonard’s counsel 
“repeatedly referred to Stemtech as an international, 
multinational or global corporation” to highlight the financial 
disparity between Leonard and Stemtech.  Appellant’s Br. 45 
(emphasis omitted).  Contrary to Stemtech’s assertions, 
reference to Stemtech’s international status was not a 
prominent “theme” throughout the trial, and thus even if 
improper, these isolated references do not constitute 
“argument injecting prejudicial extraneous evidence.”21  
Fineman, 980 F.2d at 210.   
 
 Stemtech next argues that Leonard’s counsel used the 
wrong damages standard in his closing statement, but it did 
not object to these arguments during closing, and so the 
argument is waived.22  See Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 
1377 (3d Cir. 1993) (failure to make timely objection to 
statements of counsel during closing argument is a waiver to 
challenging them on appeal).   
 
                                              
 21 Similarly, Stemtech’s claim that Leonard’s counsel 
improperly insinuated that the company operated as a 
pyramid scheme is not a basis for a new trial.  Not only were 
these references sporadic, but they also accurately describe 
Stemtech’s top-down business structure.  In any event, the 
“pyramid” references do not make it “reasonably probable” 
that the jury’s verdict was influenced by these statements, 
Fineman, 980 F.2d at 207, and therefore do not warrant a new 
trial.  
 22 To the extent Stemtech’s arguments on this point 
merely repeat its attack on Sedlik’s expert testimony, such 
arguments fail as we have determined that his testimony was 
properly admitted.   
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 Finally, Stemtech complains of “occasions that 
[Leonard’s counsel] argued unsupported issues[, which] are 
too numerous to discuss.”  Appellant’s Br. 53.  This broad 
statement does not suffice to preserve a claim of error on 
appeal.  See Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Trust v. John 
Hancock Life Ins. Co. (U.S.A), 768 F.3d 284, 292 n.3 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (discussing an issue in a single sentence may result 
in waiver); Long Hao Li v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 136, 140 n.3 
(3d Cir. 2011) (“stray references” result in waiver); John 
Wyeth & Brother Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 
1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) (raising an issue “in passing” without 
“squarely argu[ing it]” results in waiver).23     
 
 To the extent Stemtech has provided any details 
concerning such alleged misconduct, none provides a basis 
for granting a new trial.  Stemtech’s contention that 
Leonard’s counsel improperly argued that Stemtech profited 
from the infringements “despite the absence of any such 
evidence,” Appellant’s Br. 54, is meritless because there was 
sufficient evidence to permit counsel to argue that Stemtech 
profited from the use of the images, including the testimony 
                                              
 23 Similarly, Stemtech’s argument that a new trial is 
warranted due to counsel’s “additional unsupported and 
improper statements and arguments,” Appellant’s Br. 55 
(capitalization omitted), that amounted to “pleas of pure 
passion . . . [and] blatant appeals to bias and prejudice,” 
Draper, 580 F.2d at 95, has been waived.  Stemtech did not 
object to any of the summation statements it claims were 
directed to bias and passion.  See Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1377.  Even 
if Stemtech had preserved these claims of error, “at least for 
civil trials, improper comments during closing arguments 
rarely rise to the level of reversible error.”  Id. (quotation 
marks, citation, and alteration omitted).   
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from Stemtech employees that depicting stem cells was 
important to selling products that purportedly enhanced stem 
cell production. 
 
 Stemtech’s assertion that Leonard’s counsel 
improperly argued that the evidence of infringement 
presented at trial was “only the tip of the iceberg” also does 
not provide a basis for a new trial.  According to Stemtech, 
Leonard, his counsel, and Sedlik each used language at the 
trial that suggested that there were likely additional acts of 
infringement by Stemtech and its distributors that were not 
presented at trial.  To the extent Stemtech makes claims about 
what Leonard and Sedlik said during their testimony, this is 
not conduct of counsel and is irrelevant.  To the extent 
Stemtech complains about counsel’s use of the phrase during 
his argument, such a stray remark does not make it 
“reasonably probable” that the verdict was influenced by 
these statements and thus does not warrant a new trial.  
Fineman, 980 F.2d at 207.24  
                                              
 24 The District Court excluded as speculative Sedlik’s 
opinion that the 92 infringing examples that would be 
presented at trial were only the “tip of the iceberg.”  J.A. 638-
40 (order granting motion in limine in part and barring “tip of 
the iceberg” statement and opinion regarding licensing fees 
for images not at issue in the case).  To the extent Stemtech 
argues Sedlik’s testimony that “looking for usages on the 
internet is . . . an endless field of haystacks” violated this 
ruling, Stemtech objected and the District Court sustained the 
objection.  J.A. 1381.  Moreover, the District Court instructed 
the jury at the outset of trial that it should disregard evidence 
to which an objection was lodged when the objection is 
sustained, J.A. 766 (“If [an] objection is sustained, ignore the 
question.”), and jurors are presumed “to follow their 
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 For these reasons, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that none of Leonard’s counsel’s 
conduct warrants a new trial. 
 
2.  Evidentiary Rulings 
 
 The final basis for Stemtech’s motion for a new trial is 
that the District Court erred in admitting certain evidence.  
Under Fed. R. Evid. 103 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 61, “a finding of 
reversible error may not be predicated upon a ruling which 
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the 
party is affected.”  Becker v. ARCO Chem. Co., 207 F.3d 
176, 180 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Goodman v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 293 F.3d 655, 676 (3d Cir. 
2002) (“A motion for a new trial should be granted where 
substantial errors occurred in admission or rejection of 
evidence.”).  In the context of evidentiary issues raised in 
support of a request for a new trial, “particular deference is 
appropriate where the decision to grant or deny a new trial 
rested on the district court’s evidentiary ruling that itself was 
entrusted to the trial court’s discretion.”  Becker, 207 F.3d at 
180 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
 We review preserved evidentiary objections for abuse 
of discretion.  McKenna v. City of Phila., 582 F.3d 447, 460 
(3d Cir. 2009).  Where, however, a party failed to object to 
the admission of evidence before the District Court, we deem 
that objection waived on appeal.  See Lloyd v. HOVENSA, 
LLC, 369 F.3d 263, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2004) (observing that “it 
is inappropriate for an appellate court to consider a contention 
                                                                                                     
instructions.”  Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 
(1987). 
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raised on appeal that was not initially presented to the district 
court”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Waldorf v. Shuta, 
142 F.3d 601, 629 (3d Cir. 1998) (failure to object at trial 
results in waiver). 
 
 Stemtech argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion in admitting numerous exhibits and testimony, 
which it claims warrant granting a new trial.  To the extent 
Stemtech argues that the District Court erred in admitting 
certain evidence that lacked a proper foundation, Stemtech 
has waived such an objection because the District Court 
clearly ruled that foundation objections needed to be raised 
when the allegedly objectionable exhibits were offered at 
trial, and Stemtech failed to lodge a contemporaneous 
objection.   
 
 As for the 92 exhibits depicting infringing uses of 
Leonard’s images, Stemtech objected to the admission of 
these exhibits on relevance and foundation grounds.  The 
District Court properly overruled the foundation objections, 
as a foundation for the documents was laid.  First, Leonard 
explained how he found the items and identified the indicia 
within the items that showed their connection to Stemtech.  
Second, Leonard testified that he contacted certain website 
owners and learned they were Stemtech distributors.  Third, 
Stemtech failed to provide a basis to question whether the 
websites embodied in the screenshots were connected to the 
Stemtech enterprise.  In addition to the fact that the contents 
of the screenshots showed their connections with Stemtech, 
Dr. Rivka Rachel, a Stemtech distributor, testified about 
several Stemtech websites that were captured in the 
Leonard’s screenshots.   
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 Furthermore, the exhibits were relevant because, as the 
District Court stated, they are “part of what is at issue in 
terms of the allegations of infringement,” since they reflect 
the infringements Leonard discovered online.  J.A. 850.  For 
these reasons, the District Court properly admitted the 
documents embodying the infringing images.     
 
 We have reviewed all of Stemtech’s other arguments 
concerning its evidentiary objections and conclude that the 
arguments have either been waived or are meritless because 
the admission of the evidence about which Stemtech 
complains did not affect its substantial rights. 
 
 For these reasons, none of Stemtech’s evidentiary 
arguments warrants a new trial.   
 
E.  Fee Disputes 
 
 Finally, we address the two attorneys’ fees disputes: 
one arising from a discovery-related award and the second 
stemming from the second lawsuit Leonard filed against 
Stemtech. 
 
1.  Discovery Violation Award 
 
 Stemtech challenges the District Court’s order granting 
Leonard fees and costs incurred in taking a Stemtech 
employee’s deposition.25  Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(2) provides: 
If a party fails to admit what is requested under 
Rule 36 and if the requesting party later proves . 
                                              
 25 We review the decision to impose sanctions for 
abuse of discretion.  Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 538 (3d Cir. 2007).   
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. . the matter true, the requesting party may 
move that the party who failed to admit pay the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, 
incurred in making that proof.  The court must 
so order unless: 
 
 (A) the request was held objectionable 
under Rule 36(a); 
 (B) the admission sought was of no 
substantial importance; 
 (C) the party failing to admit had a 
reasonable ground to believe that  it might 
prevail on the matter; or 
 (D) there was other good reason for the 
failure to admit. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(2). 
 
 Leonard sought to prove that Stemtech controlled its 
distributors through, among other things, the use of Requests 
for Admission under Fed. R. Civ. P. 36.26  To this end, 
Leonard sent Requests for Admission to Stemtech “seeking 
Stemtech’s admission that it provided its independent 
distributors with internet sub-domains to the official Stemtech 
owned domain.”  Appellee’s Br. 65 (citing J.A. 351-69).  
Stemtech denied these requests.   
 
 Leonard later deposed George Tashjian, Stemtech’s 
Information Technology Director.  Tashjian testified that (1) 
he had never seen the requests for admission, nor had he been 
asked for his input into the answers; (2) Stemtech provided 
                                              
 26 Rule 36 provides a tool to streamline the proof of 
controverted facts.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36. 
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distributors with internet sub-domains associated with 
Stemtech’s parent website, stemtechbiz.com; and (3) the 
requests for admission concerning Stemtech’s ownership of 
the domain that Stemtech denied were, in fact, true and 
should have been admitted.  Tashjian’s testimony therefore 
established that Stemtech wrongly denied certain requests for 
admissions. 
 
 Nearly two years later, Leonard moved for an award of 
fees and costs incurred in taking Tashjian’s deposition.  See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(2).  The District Court granted the 
motion in part, awarding 50% of the $3,048.30 requested, 
because only a portion of the deposition pertained to the 
control issue.   
 
 Stemtech’s conduct falls within the ambit of Rule 
37(c)(2) and, despite Stemtech’s argument that the sanctions 
motion was not expeditiously filed and the requested 
admission pertained to a matter of no substantial importance 
under Rule 37(c)(2)(B), this exception to the mandatory 
imposition of sanctions does not apply.  Leonard sought the 
admission of facts concerning Stemtech’s control over its 
distributors’ websites, which was a crucial component of 
Leonard’s vicarious and contributory infringement claims.  
Because this issue was central to Leonard’s secondary 
infringement claims, Stemtech had no factual basis for 
denying the request, and Leonard incurred expenses to prove 
these facts during Tashjian’s deposition, the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions to Leonard.  
See Yoder & Frey Auctioneers, Inc. v. EquipmentFacts, LLC, 
774 F.3d 1065, 1074-75 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding nominal 
Rule 37(c)(2) sanctions and costs where withholding party 
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“did not have reasonable grounds to believe it might 
prevail”).  
 
2.  Stemtech’s Prevailing Party Fee Request 
 
 We are also asked to review a fee ruling arising from 
Leonard’s second lawsuit against Stemtech, alleging new 
infringing uses he discovered while this case was pending.  
The District Court granted Stemtech’s motion for summary 
judgment in the second case.  As the prevailing party in the 
second suit, Stemtech moved for an award of attorney’s fees 
pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505.  The District Court denied the 
motion. 
 
 The Copyright Act permits a discretionary award of 
attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in a copyright lawsuit.  
17 U.S.C. § 505; Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 533 
(1994) (noting § 505 “clearly connotes discretion” and a 
district court may not “award[] attorney’s fees as a matter of 
course”).  Several factors guide the exercise of discretion in 
this context, including “frivolousness, motivation, objective 
unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of 
the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance 
considerations of compensation and deterrence.”  Id. at 534 
n.19 (quoting Lieb. v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 
156 (3d Cir. 1986)).  The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed 
that § 505 fee awards are discretionary and placed extra, but 
not controlling, weight on the “objective unreasonableness” 
factor, and reminded courts to consider the totality of the 
circumstances and make a “particularized, case-by-case 
assessment.”  Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. 
Ct. 1979, 1985 (2016) (quoting Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 527, 534 
n.19).   
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  The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied Stemtech’s fee motion in the second suit.  The District 
Court applied the Fogerty factors and determined that there 
was no evidence that Leonard’s decision to file the second 
suit was objectively unreasonable, frivolous, or in bad faith 
because “Leonard ha[d] reason to believe Stemtech was 
engaged in ongoing and new infringement, that was not the 
subject of [the first suit],” and accordingly “had a non-
sanctionable, non-frivolous basis to file [the second suit].”  
J.A. 40.  Despite the temporal proximity between the filing of 
the second suit and unfavorable rulings in this case, where 
Leonard was denied leave to amend his complaint and the 
ability to seek infringer’s profits and statutory damages, the 
District Court appropriately adopted the Magistrate Judge’s 
findings that “the filing of [the second suit] was not an end-
run around” these adverse rulings in the first suit but rather 
stemmed from Leonard’s belief that Stemtech continued to 
engage in new infringing activity, and thus was not “a bad 
faith attempt to re-litigate issues that have been decided 
[against Leonard] in [the first suit].”  J.A. 40-41 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   Because it had a factual basis for 
concluding that the filing of the second suit was objectively 
reasonable, the District Court acted within its discretion in 
denying Stemtech’s fee motion. 
 
III 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s rulings on all issues except for its order denying 
Leonard’s motion for prejudgment interest, which we will 
vacate and remand for further proceedings. 
